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MORAL RIGHTS AND THE REALISTIC 
LIMITS OF ARTISTIC CONTROL 
Artists, musicians, and authors have a substantial need to 
protect their work from being presented to the public in a dis-
torted form. In addition to their insecurity in depending on the 
public for financial support, most artists are relatively unsophis-
ticated in the business, commercial, and legal aspects of their 
art. It is essential that artists understand the scope and limits of 
available protections - statutory, judicial, contractual, or 
otherwise. 
Protection of artistic works raises difficult issues, some of 
which do not lend themselves to legal analysis and solutions. 
Foremost is the question: When has an artistic work been al-
tered in such a way that the author/artist/composer may be 
damaged economically or personally? Other questions arise, such 
as: Has the original work been diluted and mutilated? Who is 
competent to decide? How far may authorized adaptations devi-
ate in order to express the adapter's personal vision? To what 
degree do technological requirements affect the transfer of a 
work of art from one medium to another? Who should reshape 
the work to suit the newer medium? And finally, what protec-
tions are available for the creator's reputation and personality? 
There exists a growing tendency to recognize rights in personal-
ity and in the integrity of the creator's work. While it i.s laudable 
to champion increased rights for artists, there are problems and 
conflicts apparent in proposing to expand the right of integrity 
in the United States" 
This Comment explores the relative positions of musical 
composers, visual artists, and writers against the available legal 
protections for their personal rights. As one author recognizes: 
"[E]ven as American law begins to recognize artists' rights be-
1. Support for statutory or judicial recognition by the United States of a moral 
rights doctrine can be found in a number of thorough and well-reasoned law review arti-
cles. See, e.g., Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other 
Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244 (1978); Berg, Moral Rights and the Compulsory Li-
cense for Phonorecords, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 67 (1979). 
447 
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yond copyright, it does so within a tradition that is concerned 
for the interests of many parties."2 
We are the music-makers, 
And we are the dreamers of dreams, 
Wandering by lone sea-breakers, 
And sitting by desolate streams; 
World -losers and world-forsakers, 
On whom the pale moon gleams: 
Yet we are the movers and shakers 
Of the world for ever, it seems.s 
The ancient troubadours had few restraints on their artistic 
expression. As they wandered, dependent on the spontaneous 
generosity of their listeners, they freely composed ballads out of 
current events. Whatever audience a troubadour could capture 
would be surprised either by new words to familiar melodies 
(sometimes secular variations on sacred hymns) or completely 
fresh material. As the early ballads spread, other balladeers 
modified them to suit their own talents and style, or their per-
sonal tastes in melody and meter. Names and other facts in the 
songs were freely adapted to suit a particular locale, and true 
authorship was difficult to fix. 
Perhaps early ballad-makers longed for some protection to 
prevent distortion of their songs and damage to their artistic 
reputations. Perhaps they wished a monopoly over exploitation 
of their ballads for economic benefits. Today, the need for eco-
nomic safeguards is met by federal copyright law, which pro-
vides the copyright owner with the exclusive rights to reproduce, 
distribute, publicly perform, or display the creative artist's work, 
and to prepare derivative works! The federal statute does not, 
however, explicitly protect the artist's personal rights, generally 
called "moral rights." 
2. Da Silva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' 
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. CR. Soc. 1, 56 (1980). The author 
points up the limitations in application of the French statute, and questions whether 
vesting the artist with the moral right of integrity is the fairest and most effective way to 
ensure that artists' interests are protected. [d. at 12, 37. 
3. A.W.E. O'Shaughnessy, Ode, A LITTLE TREASURY OF GREAT POETRY 676 (0. Wil-
liams ed. 19(7). 
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
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I. RECOGNITION OF MORAL RIGHTS 
The doctrine of moral rights exists in many civil law nations 
as a separate interest from the protection of the artist's eco-
nomic rights. "It includes non-property attributes of an intellec-
tual and moral character which give legal expression to the inti-
mate bond which exists between a literary or artistic work and 
its author's personality; it is intended to protect his personality 
as well as his work."6 Under this doctrine, the creator of an ar-
tistic work exercises rights in three main areas: 1) he may con-
trol publication and may withhold or withdraw the work from 
publication; 2) he may have his name associated with the work 
or protect his anonymity with a pseudonym, or he may protect 
against false attribution; and 3) he may control modifications 
and alterations of the work to prevent its distortion or 
mutilation.8 
Most European countries are members of the Berne Con-
vention which provides standards for the protection of droit 
moral, or moral rights.7 Basi~ally, two rights are described: the 
5. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under 
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMPo L. 465, 465 (1968). 
6. Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Cre-
ators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 245 (1978). 
7. UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Berne Copyright Union, 
Paris Act, Article 6 bis (2) (1971). Article 6, a revision of the 1928 Rome text of the 
Berne Convention, reads: 
[d. 
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any dis-
tortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be preju-
dicial to his honour or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at 
least until the expiration of the economic rights, and shall be 
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the 
legislation of the country where protection is claimed. How-
ever, those coUntries whose legislation, at the moment of their 
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the 
protection after the death of the author of all the rights set 
out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of 
these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted 
by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the coun-
try where protection is claimed. 
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right of paternity (the right to have one's authorship recog-
nized), and the right of integrity (the right to prevent others 
from mutilating one's work).8 In one French case, the right of 
integrity was upheld when artist Bernard Buffet was able to op-
pose the sale of separate elements of the refrigerator he had 
painted, claiming the decoration was done as an integral artistic 
unit.9 French law extends recognition of moral rights to the right 
of disclosure (the right to decide when or whether one's work is 
completed), and the right to withdraw or disavow (limited by 
the author's obligation to compensate a publisher for losses in-
curred by withdrawal of the work).lo 
Recognition of moral rights is well established in Europe, 
deriving largely from judicial decisions of French courts since 
the middle of the nineteenth century. When the rules that came 
out of these decisions became codified in 1957, respect for the 
work of art was supported by statute.ll "Even before droit moral 
was codified, French jurists recognized that droit moral is at-
tached not to the work, but to the person who created it, and 
thus it remains vested in the artist even after the object itself 
has been transferred. "l2 
While the United States has not yet given official acknowl-
edgement to a moral rights doctrine, the courts have struggled 
over the years to find a reasonable theory on which to uphold 
personal rights. Federal copyright law is designed to protect an 
author's economic rights by providing a limited-term monopoly 
over exploitation of the author's worklS and remedial measures 
against infringement.14 The thrust of the statute is to grant pro-
tections to the proprietary interests of the copyright owner, who 
may not be the artistic creator. . 
8.Id. 
9. Judgment of May 30, 1962, [1962) D. Jur. 570 (Cours d'appel Paris); Judgment of 
July 6, 1965, [1965) Gaz. Pal. 2, 126 (Cour de Cessation). 
10. Sarraute, supra note 5, at 467, 477. 
11. Id. at 465, 466. 
12. De Silva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' 
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. CR. Soc. 1, 12 (1980). 
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
14. Id. §§ 501-510. 
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II. FEDERAL STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 
When the Copyright Act was revised in 1976, some of the 
changes were designed to bring the Act into conformity with in-
ternational copyright doctrine and practice. Protection is now 
one-term11l and available without formalities. 11l Limited recogni-
tion of a moral right for music composers is now part of the 
statute. 17 
Provided the owner of the copyright in a musical composi-
tion has authorized the initial distribution of a recording of the 
work, anyone else who so desires may obtain a compulsory li-
cense to make and distribute his own recording of the composi-
tion by paying the prescribed statutory royalties to the com-
poser. III This scheme represents a compromise between the 
desire to encourage composers to continue creating (by provid-
ing them assurance of regulation of royalty collections) while 
discouraging monopoly within the recording industry, so that 
copyrighted music is accessible to the public.1e 
The music industry has always supported the compulsory 
license aspect of the copyright statute which secures their access 
to copyrighted music. Fears were expressed early that any grant 
by a composer or copyright proprietor of exclusive rights would 
permit monopolization of recording rights to popular music, 
"and by controlling these copyrights monopolize the business of 
manufacturing and selling music producing machines, otherwise 
free to the world. "20 
The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act reveals the 
15. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976). A single term measured by the life of the author plus 
fifty years is consistent with most countries of the world. 
16. Id. §§ 405(8), 408(a). 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). Once an authorized sound recording is distributed to the 
public, section· 115(a) (2) provides: "A compulsory license includes the privilege of making 
a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or 
manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not 
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work .... " Id. 
18. Note, Moral Rights and the Compulsory License for Phonorecords, 46 BROOK. 
L. REV. 67 (1979). 
19. Case Comment, Copyright· Compulsory Licensing, Similar Use and Piracy, 10 
SUFFOLK L. REv. 1275, 1278 (1976). 
20. H.R. REP. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909). 
5
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legislative intent of section 115: "The second clause of subsec-
tion (a) is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited 
privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a 
compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be per-
verted, distorted, or travestied."21 This is directly analagous to 
the right of integrity component of droit moral recognized under 
French law/a2 
One experienced attorney who represents recording artists 
has serious questions about the extent of changes that may be 
made in arranging a song. He comments that the compulsory li-
cense section is vaguely worded, and that a judge may not have 
the appropriate understanding of music to make an easy or 
proper determination.lIs Some freedom must be given to the li-
censee in making his own creative product short of altering the 
integrity of the underlying composition. The arranger has the 
right to create an "individual instrumental or· vocal 
arrangement. "24 
Although the 1976 Copyright Act preempts coextensive 
state protection, the Act preserves other federal remedies. IS Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Trademarks Act,28 while primarily a 
law preventing deceptive packaging of goods in interstate com-
merce, has been interpreted to encompass a range of deceptive 
trade practices, including those resulting in false attribution and 
distortion of literary and artistic works.1I7 A singer brought suit 
successfully under this theory when the re-release of an old al-
bum presented his old style and old songs to his public. The 
court found that the current likeness of the singer on an album 
cover constituted a misrepresentation because the recording was 
more than ten years old.28 
21. Copyright Law Revision of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 109, 
(1976). 
22. Rosen, Droit Moral for Musical Compositions: Section 115 of the New Copy-
right Act, 5 ART AND THE LAW 88 (1980). 
23. Telephone interview with Stanley Diamond, practicing music law attorney, Los 
Angeles (September I, 1983). 
24. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp. 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1976). 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). 
27. Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530, 185 U.S.P.Q. 508 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). 
28. [d. at 531. See, infra, note 29 and accompanying text in which the Lanham Act 
is broadly applied. 
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III. THE MONTY PYTHON CASE 
The case that has stirred up the most excitement over moral 
rights is the "Monty Python" case,lIB in which the Second Circuit 
articulated the frustration of trying to grant relief for violations 
of personal rights when no explicit statutory protection is availa-
ble. The case involved the unauthorized deletion of twenty-four 
out of ninety minutes of a program made by Monty Python, the 
popular British comedy group. ABC made the deletions so com-
mercials could be inserted, and censored portions that they 
found offensive or obscene. The district court found that the 
cuts impaired the integrity of the work causing it to lose its 
"iconoclastic verve. "SO Although the court formally based relief 
on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which was intended to deal 
solely with the use of trademarks for false ·advertising, the ra-
tionale of the court reveals outright recognition of droit moral.S } 
In his majority opinion, Judge Lumbard stated that al-
though American copyright law recognizes only economic rights, 
these rights are so closely tied to personal or moral rights as to 
be nearly indistinguishable: 
[Although] courts have recognized that licensees 
are entitled to some small degree of latitude in ar-
ranging the licensed work for presentation to the 
public in a manner consistent with the licensee's 
style or standards . . . the cuts made [by ABC] 
constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty 
Python's work. This cause of action, which seeks 
redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds 
its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, 
or moral right, which may generally be summa-
rized as including the right of the artist to have 
his work attributed to him in the form in which 
he created it.sa 
The court's attitude clearly is that copyright law should be the 
vehicle to recognize the position of the artist and the need for 
adequate legal protection. Such protection encourages produc-
29. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21, 192 
U.S.P.Q. 1, 5-8 (CA 1 1976). 
30. [d. at 18. 
31. Rosen, supra note 22, at 89. 
32. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-4. 
7
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tion and dissemination of artistic works.33 
The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) entered an 
agreement with Monty Python in which the comedy group re-
served control over editing. The BBC was not permitted to grant 
editing rights to ABC in the sub-license agreement. The re-
corded program was a derivative work based on the script in 
which Monty Python held the copyright. The recorded pro-
gram's copyright was owned by the BBC, but its use of the re-
corded program was "limited by the license granted to BBC by 
Monty Python for use of the underlying script. "34 
Under the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act, if the au-
thor has not transferred rights, any derivative version or public 
performance of the work would be an infringement of the au-
thor's copyright.31i However, once the author has authorized an 
adaptation, under the Act the author may not legally object to 
the artistic result as long as the result conforms to the bounda-
ries of the transfer agreement.38 "One who obtains permission to 
use a copyrighted script in the production of a derivative work, 
however, may not exceed the specific purpose for which permis-
sion was granted. "37 
Due to the extent of the editing and the breach of the con-
tractual provisions regarding editing, the court concluded there 
was a likelihood of copyright infringement. Because the broad-
cast version departed substantially from the original work, the 
court found a valid cause of action for the distortion under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.38 Judge Gurfein argued against 
the section 43(a) claim in his dissent, commenting that the stat-
ute does not deal with artistic integrity or moral rights.3s 
Cases since Gilliam appear to step lightly around the moral 
rights stand taken by the Second Circuit. In National Bank of 
33. [d. at 23. 
34. [d. at 19. 
35. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). 
36. Comment, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act 01 1976, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1505 (1979). 
37. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20. 
38. [d. at 24-25. 
39. [d. at 27. 
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Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.,40 the court was persuaded by Gil-
liam's holding that copyright infringement occurs when a licen-
see exceeds his license, and that an author has rights over the 
context and manner of presentation of his work. The Shaklee 
court, however, emphasized contractual rather than intellectual 
property rights.41 
Another post-Gilliam editing case42 more directly observed 
that moral rights have found protection under case law in this 
country. The court found the plaintiff's moral right "subsumed 
in his contractual right to seek redress for the alleged mutilation 
of his article. "43 Again, the courts find it easier to recognize 
moral rights when a contract is involved. Even more recently, an 
Illinois court44 adopted Gilliam's holding that copyright in-
fringement will be found when a licensee exceeds the license 
grant from the copyright holder by performing unauthorized 
editing!1I 
Gilliam's impact is yet to be fully realized. Unmistakably, a 
foundation has been established with the first clearly articulated 
acceptance of moral rights by a federal appeals court. The im-
portance of the Second Circuit's decision has not been missed. 
When "the nation's premier copyright court"46 establishes a new 
attitude, there is the promise of a new vitality in a doctrine that 
was previously avoided. 
IV. STATE PROTECTION FOR VISUAL ARTISTS 
Recognition of the need for expanded protection is growing, 
particularly in relation to visual artists. One commentator47 sug-
gests that visual artists create in a rather solitary manner. Con-
sequently, associations are not formed as in the case of other 
creative artists. Musicians and composers have protective op-
tions available such as unions, performance rights societies (e.g., 
40. National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (1980). 
41. [d. at 544. 
42. Edison v. Viva International, Ltd., 70 App. Div. 2d 379, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 203 
(1979). 
43. [d. at 421 N.Y.S. at 206. 
44. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 693 F.2d 622 (1982). 
45. [d. at 625. 
46. Gracen v. Bradford, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
47. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 S.D.L. REv. 675, 678 (1982). 
9
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ASCAP and BMI), as well as the federal copyright statute. Writ-
ers for television and film are bolstered by membership in active 
national and local unions and guilds. Novelists, choreographers, 
directors, scene designers, and other entertainment industry 
professionals also look to their unions and guilds for advice, 
comfort, and strength. Support groups and professional organi-
zations are less available to visual artists; therefore, legal protec-
tions are essential. 
Fine artists in California (creators of paintings, sculptures 
or drawings) have recently been afforded statutory protection4S 
to prevent the intentional "physical defacement, mutilation, al-
teration or destruction"4e of the artist's work, including the right 
to claim or disclaim authorship. GO While no case law has yet 
emerged testing the statute, the influence of this bold legislation 
is beginning to be felt elsewhere. Gl 
V. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RELIEF 
Without a formal moral rights statute addressing the works 
of writers, and without protection broader than that offered 
composers under the compulsory license section of the Copy-
right Act, artists will continue to seek redress of violations 
through alternative theories. Over the years the success rate has 
been inconsistent. While a number of opinions make reference to 
moral rights, the courts usually seek a contract or unfair prac-
tices basis for granting relief. In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc.,GZ the 
. 48. The California Art Preservation Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (Deering 
Supp. 1982). 
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (Deering Supp. 1982). 
SO. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d) (Deering Supp. 1982). 
51. New York has recently passed its own moral rights statute for visual artists simi-
lar to the California legislation. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 228-m (1983). Legislation in this 
area is even more notable coming as it does from the two states with the largest popula-
tion of artists, including major artists, and which are the centers of the publishing, art, 
and entertainment industries. The impact on other jurisdictions throughout the country 
is as yet unmeasured. In fact, no case law has yet emerged testing the California statute. 
52. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 
813 (1948). The court expressed its discomfort with the moral rights issue: 
Plaintiff advances another theory which needs little discus-. 
sion. It is predicated upon the contention that there is a dis-
tinction between the economic rights of an author capable o( 
assignment and what are called "moral rights" of the author 
said to be necessary for the protection of his honor and integ-
rity .... What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law 
10
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Seventh Circuit was unwilling to recognize an artist's paternity 
right. The artist had sold his drawings to Esquire magazine, 
which published them without attributing authorship to Vargas. 
Without a contractual provision requiring that Vargas' name be 
used, the court refused to allow a presumption of an agreement 
allowing the artist to claim authorship. Such unwillingness is not 
surprising considering there is no historical context in this coun-
try for an inherent right to claim authorship. Our copyright stat-
ute, in fact, provides that in the case of a work made for hire the 
. employer may be considered the author. liS 
Relief was granted in a Second Circuit case" in which rec-
ord producer Norman Granz contracted with the purchaser of 
his master recordings to require that credit to Granz be printed 
on the record labels. Abbreviated versions of the recordings were 
sold (bearing Granz's name on the jackets) and Granz objected. 
The court found a breach of the contract and false representa-
tion leading to unfair competition.1I11 Once again, droit moral was 
considered and was seen as inappropriate as the basis for the 
decision.1I6 
Artists are understandably confused with divurgent results 
such as these. Vargas had no specific contract clause requiring 
artist credit while Granz managed to obtain such an express pro-
vision. Without a statutory right in paternity, American courts 
are generally unwilling to provide relief when the parties have 
no contractual duties for the court to adjudge. Perhaps, too, the 
Id. 
in this country to conform to that of certain other countries. 
We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desira-
ble, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the gov-
ernment; in any event, we are not disposed to make any new 
law in this respect. 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 20I(b) (1976). 
54. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952). 
55. [d. 
56. Id. at 590. (Frank, J. concurring) 
[I)t is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a 
version which substantially departs from the original . . . 
[however) without rejecting the doctrine of "moral right," I 
think that, in the light of the foregoing, we should not rest 
decision on that doctrine where, as here, it is not necessary to 
do so. 
Id. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, 
and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). 
11
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Granz court was more sympathetic than the Vargas court be-
cause of the nature of the defendant's conduct in deleting eight 
minutes of performance from Granz's recordings.1I'7 
Some latitude is granted licensees to adapt a work in light 
of industry practice, yet an express contractual provision to en-
join editing will be upheld. liB Relief was denied in a case involv-
ing Otto Preminger's movie, "Anatomy of a Murder," because it 
was found that the proposed cuts in the film were within accept-
able limits. However, the court noted that substantial cuts could 
be described as "mutilation" and said: "Should such 'mutilation' 
occur in the future, plaintiffs may make application to this 
Court for injunctive or other relief. . . . "1i9 
A prominent film director who had retained editing rights in 
his contract unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a television network 
from editing his feature film. so While the court was impressed 
with the "unusual and rare grant to plaintiff of sole control over 
production,"sl they agreed with the trial court that the commer-
cial interruptions did not affect the integrity of the film. They 
further took notice of testimony that "plaintiff's ability to com-
mand the highest compensation was not adversely affected by 
the televising of his films."s2 As in the Preminger case, the court 
felt impelled to interpret the contract according to the prevail-
ing custom in the trade which allows stationmasters the right to 
use their judgment regarding cutting and editing.s8 Perhaps an 
attentive attorney could have preserved the protections sought 
by Preminger and the movie owner. A stronger case is made 
when editing is evaluated as violative of an agreement between 
the parties. 
A New York courts. questioned the existence of a moral 
57. Granz, 198 F.2d at 588. 
58. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc.2d 363, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 594 (1966), 
aff'd without op. 25 App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd without op. 18 N.Y.2d 659, 
219 N.E.2d 431 (1966). 
59. [d. 
60. Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 C.A.2d 886, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106 (2nd 
Dist. 1969). 
61. [d. at 893. 
62. [d. 
63. Preminger, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 599, 600. 
64. Shostakovich v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 
575, 579, 77 aff'd 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). 
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right, though the claim was based on defamation, rather than on 
distortion of the plaintiffs' work. Several Russian composers 
brought suit because the use of their public domain music in the 
sound track of a film cast upon them the false imputation of 
being disloyal to their country, due to the film's political atti-
tude. The court was hesitant to grant relief without a clear 
showing of the existence of libel, and "in the absence of any 
clear showing. . . of any invasion of a moral right. . . ."eG Per-
haps if the composers' music was not in the public domain, the 
result would have been different. The artists would then be enti-
tled to protection under copyright law and would have more 
control over the use of their creations in a context which is not 
offensive to their beliefs. When the same composers brought suit 
in France, historically a more receptive forum, they succeeded 
with their libel claim, proving violation of their moral rights, and 
prevented the showing of the same film.66 
On a theory of invasion of privacy, John Lennon succeeded 
in preventing distribution of a recording of his music on the 
grounds that the poor quality of both the recording and the al-
bum cover design amounted to mutilation of his work and injury 
to his reputation.67 Evidence was presented that Lennon and his 
wife had posed nude for a previous album cover, to support the 
defendant's argument that Lennon's reputation was already im-
pure. The court maintained that the trial court had come to the 
correct conclusion: the album cover was "cheap-looking, if not 
ugly," and the quality of the recording was "shoddy and 
fuzzy. "68 Fortunately for Lennon, the court was able to compare 
this album to Lennon's other work and appreciate the difference 
in quality. Another court with different musical taste and judg-
ment might produce a contrary assessment. The Lennon deci-
sion raises the issue that the artist may be a victim of a court's 
subjective response to a piece of art. 
When special knowledge is required to analyze and under-
stand a particular cause of action, expert testimony is usually 
provided by both sides. While experts in computer technology, 
medicine, or even auto repair may differ, at least objective mea-
65.Id. 
66. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1952, [1952) D. Jur. II 204 (Cours d'appel Paris). 
67. Big Seven Music v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977). 
68.Id. 
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surements, tests, and standards based on industry practices are 
available for consideration. The arts do not lend themselves to 
such objectifying. Certainly, standards of taste exist and "clas-
sics" are universally recognized. But for a pop song, a new play 
by an unknown writer, a sculpture by a new artist, where are the 
tests? Which critic can claim that his or her personal taste is the 
most refined? While these questions are unanswerable, the inse-
curity of the artist's position is imp·ortant to recognize. 
When contractual protections were lacking in another New 
York case69 the court was still inclined to find a theory for grant-
ing relief because, as the plaintiff claimed, the paperback reprint 
of a book altered the original text so extensively, primarily by 
omissions, as to constitute mutilation. A moral rights claim, the 
court suggested, is given limited recognition in New York, and is 
usually tied up with contractual terms. Yet, the court demon-
strated its recognition of the problem when it stated, "[e]ven af-
ter a transfer or assignment of an author's work, the author has 
a property right that it shall not be used for a purpose not in-
tended or in a manner which does not fairly represent the crea-
tion of the author."70 The defendant publisher was ordered to 
inform the public that omissions and juxtapositions were made 
in the paperback version of the plaintiff's book.71 A judicial 
stance of this nature is a hopeful sign that American courts are 
beginning to recognize, as do the Europeans, that an author has 
personal rights which remain with him even after proprietary 
rights have been transferred. While such recognition has been 
slow in coming, every vindication of a creator's rights along 
these lines has an influence on future judicial determinations. 
VI. PROBLEMS AND EVALUATION 
Editorial tampering is the historical enemy of a writer. 
Other concerns shared by writers are offered by a legal scholar 
who has studied the fields of publishing, entertainment, and the 
arts: 
What if he sells a story and it is never published? 
69. Chesler v. Avon Book Division, Hearst Publications, Inc., 76 Misc._2d 1048,352 
N.Y.S. 2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
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What if he sells an article, and a "collaborator" is 
foisted on him who then gets co-authorship 
credit? What if he sells an article that represents 
his views on a certain subject as of the time of 
writing, and the article is not published until 
years later when his views have changed? What if 
he sells an article to a publication of some repute, 
and later finds that it appears (via a transfer in 
bankruptcy, say) in another of dubious standing? 
While these questions might not arise as fre-
quently as those pertaining to editorial interfer-
ence, they are by no means as rare as one might 
suppose.7lI 
A. Adaptation 
461 
A common occurrence in the entertainment world is the li-
censing by a relatively unknown writer of a work of fiction to a 
major television studio or to a film production company. Invaria-
bly, the author is not permitted to transfer the work to the 
screenplay format required for the medium.· Experienced staff 
writers who understand the technology of television or film are 
given the job of adaptation. 
Moral rights are at issue when a work is adapted to another 
medium. Many writers view adaptions with suspicion as a possi-
ble distortion or mutilation of their underlying work. When the 
new author arrives at his or her attorney's office with a contract 
offer, there is time to negotiate for some control over the adapta-
tion. While editing control is rarely granted unless the writer 
commands the privilege by virtue of the writer's fame and desir-
ability, some measure of involvement may be obtained. A writer 
can be included as a consultant, or as an associate writer during 
the adaptation process or at the editing stage. More success is 
likely if the artist is dealing with a small, independent produc-
tion company willing to relinquish some control. 
The adaptation of The French Lieutenant's Woman from 
the traditional literary print medium to the technologically ad-
72. LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS - AGREEMENTS AND THE 
LAw, 2308-09 (2d ed. 1983) (three-volume set containing valuable cases, comments and 
forms, including agency agreements for talent and creative works). 
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vanced medium of film illustrates inherent conflicts, though the 
problems never resulted in a lawsuit. When John Fowles' novel 
was adapted by the skilled playwright and screenwriter Harold 
Pinter, the resultant film was considered "dull and distancing."73 
While the movie was generally popular, its limitations kept it 
from being a critical success. Pinter, seriously interested in form, 
used the device of enclosing the movie within a movie as a way 
of dealing with the literary issues of the novel. In the book, the 
author created a narrator to discuss nineteenth century novels 
as his device for writing a nineteenth century novel. Pinter's 
choices and prerogatives were clever, sophistocated, and respect-
ful of the novel's artistic integrity; yet, they did not work." The 
adapter was concerned with preserving the original, underlying 
book; yet, he was not writing another version of the book - he 
was creating another form. Perhaps 'faithfulness to the original' 
is an inappropriate standard to determine whether an author's 
moral rights have been violated. 
Along with the issue of standards arises the critical ques-
tion: Who decides? The original author may be an excellent 
critic of novels, yet may not have the skill or esthetic sense to 
judge a screenplay, particularly when he or she is emotionally 
attached to the work being adapted. John Fowles was thor-
oughly satisfied with the film adaptation of his novel, even while 
the critics were not. More problems will undoubtedly arise when 
the film is shown on television, assuming the author's original 
agreement grants subsidiary rights to the film company, as is the 
usual industry practice. 
Adaptations for television are typically worked into a for-
mat of multiple, brief scenes, with visuals occupying a more 
prominent position than dialogue. Because television is in the 
home, the material is designed to fit into a context of intimacy 
and casualness. Television exists as a commercial medium, and 
frequent commercial advertisements, usually loud and active, 
are inserted to hold the attention of the passive, even somnolent 
viewer.7Ii As the Gilliam case points out, however, unauthorized 
73. Telephone interview with Paul Singer, Film Critic of The Twin Cities Times 
(June 22, 1983). 
74. [d. 
75. This author's experience as a broadcaster (producer, writer) from 1967-1976 has 
provided a perspective on some of the special needs and problems in working with the 
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editing can be considered substantial enough to alter the nature 
of the work, and a breach of the license agreement and copyright 
infringement may be found. 7~ 
One French scholar has expressed appreciation of the sensi-
tive issues implicated when an author complains of distortion in 
the adaptation process. Just as critical a concern is the position 
of the judge in making a purely esthetic appraisal as the basis 
for a court decision.77 He suggests that attorneys simplify the 
assignment of rights in adaptation contracts which would avoid 
placing the courts in a difficult position and which would make 
esthetic disputes unnecessary. One approach grants the author 
approval rights over the adaptation. Another arrangement would 
permit the author to create the script for a film adaptation of his 
or her work, modifications of which would require the author's 
consent. The final idea is the realistic alternative to the first two: 
"to trust the adapter and accept the risks involved. "78 
B. Legal Action 
When the new writer is intent on bringing suit for violation 
of the personal integrity of his or her writing, the theory indicat-
ing the likeliest success is breach of contract. Case histories 
demonstrate that the courts are most comfortable determining 
rights and obligations of the parties according to the promises 
set forth in a written agreement. If the contract is silent in the 
particular area surrounding the violation, the writer's attorney 
may have to research customs in the trade and prior conduct 
between the licensee and other writer!? If the defendant is a pro-
duction company that often turns good writing into porno-
graphic scripts, the court will likely find that the writer should 
have known such reputation. If plot elements are rearranged, the 
court would likely look at whether the writer's work appears gar-
bled or mutilated before granting relief. Unless the court is high-
ly offended by the defendant's conduct, the interests of both 
sides will be balanced. 
medium of television. 
76. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20-21, 192 U.S.P.Q. 5-8. 
77. Sarraute, supra note 5 at 482. 
78. [d. 
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If express provisions of a contract have not been breached, 
yet the writer is dissatisfied with the treatment of his or her 
work, a theory of invasion of privacy or false representation may 
succeed in obtaining equitable relief. If the quality of a filmed 
version of the author's work is amateurish, poorly adapted, 
poorly performed, or difficult to see or hear, the artist's attorney 
may be able to bring a successful libel action, arguing injury to 
the writer's reputation and loss of future writing offers. 
Statutory violations are another area in which the courts 
appear comfortable when called upon to assess a moral rights 
argument. A claim may succeed if the writer can show that the 
extent to which his or her story has been rewritten fundamen-
tally changes its nature so that the public would be misled to 
believe the writer was the source of the work. If a television sta-
tion interrupts the story excessively, changes key story elements, 
or alters the characters, the court may find a violation of the 
Lanham Act,79 insofar as the writer is presented to the public as 
the creator of a work not his or her own. 
When the writer argues that the serious manipulation of his 
or her story, language, or characters exceeds the boundaries of 
the transfer agreement, the court may find an infringement of 
the federal copyright statute. When the underlying work is used 
in an unauthorized manner and is fragmented or distorted, the 
courts are now more inclined to find an infringement of the 
writer's copyright control. 
C. Cooperation in the Industry 
One experienced attorney sees "sensitive editing of feature 
films for television" as the critical concern in the context of 
moral rights.80 Whereas Congress, unlike legislatures in civil law 
countries, has appeared reluctant to issue expanded rights to 
artists,81 the attorney suggests that the Motion Picture Associa-
79. 15 u.s.c. § 1125(a) (1970). 
so. Interview with Robert E. Gordon, practicing entertainment law attorney, in San 
Francisco (June 23, 1983). 
81. Three different attempts were made in recent legislative history to amend the 
federal copyright statute by adding a new subsection (d) to section 113 ("Scope of exclu-
sive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). Each proposal was sent to a 
committee of the Judiciary, with no serious action yet taken. The proposed "Visual Art-
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tion of America (MP AA) set the standards for tasteful, careful 
editing, attentive to the input from professional groups such as 
the Directors Guild and the Writers Guild. 
The television industry alone has yet to set up standards for 
the extent of permissible cuts, the maximum number of inter-
ruptions, and the duration of the interruptions. Their treatment 
of the problem is merely to identify some films as "edited for 
television. "82 
An affiliation agreement between the major studios and the 
guilds would reflect an awareness of the need for editing stan-
dards. Such industry cooperation may be the only viable means 
of influencing this practice. An author granting film rights is 
quite removed from the power level along the production chain. 
He or she is often thrilled with the opportunity to have a work 
produced, and accepts the position of impotence once the work 
is licensed. Some have distinguished themselves sufficiently to 
contract for some artistic control over editing. Occasionally pro-
tection is lacking because the contract is silent. More often than 
not, however, the contract will be written to exclude the artist.83 
ists Moral Rights Amendment" reads: 
Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic 
or sculptural work, the author or the author's legal representa-
tive shall have the right, during the life of the author and fifty 
years after the author's death, to claim authorship of such 
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other al-
teration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded 
in the Copyright Office that would prevent prejudice to the 
author's honor or reputation. 
H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977); 
H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 
H.R. 2908, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 
H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
The legislative assistants to Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) report that no hear-
ings .have yet been held on the most recent proposal, but that the resolution was refiled 
this session. Telephone interview with Ann Kelly (August 4, 1983), and Bill Black (Au-
gust 16, 1983). 
82. LINDEY, supra note 72, at 146. 
83. Interview with Chris Door, Producer with Korty Films Co., in Mill Valley, CA. 
(August 5, 1983), emphasizing that "compromise is the nature of the film industry," and 
that unless one puts up his own money, "the studio and the network have the final cut." 
[d. 
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D. Emerging Technology - Unknown Encroachments 
As new technology changes the face of popular entertain-
ment, the rapid developments delight and frighten us at the 
same time. Electronic publishing, among the newest forms to 
emerge, is an electronic means of transmitting pictures and text 
over the air, by cable, or by telephone wires, displaying the text 
on a television screen or other terminal. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) recently gave television stations per-
mission to broadcast written or graphic information nationwide 
using a system called teletext.84 
However, when such apparent freedom is granted to use a 
potentially powerful, pervasive medium, self-regulation may be 
inadequate. California Lawyer's reporter projects concern when 
he states: "There are many unanswered questions about how 
copyright, libel, defamation, obscenity and privacy laws will ap-
ply to electronic publishing. UBI! Some of those questions may be 
addressed if the Media Access Project in Washington, D.C. peti-
tions the FCC for reconsideration of its rulings. Unclear as yet, 
are the possible risks to artists and their work when utilized over 
this medium. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Until the artist is capable of bargaining from a position of 
power, his or her moral rights will be protected only through ex-
isting legal doctrines and a sympathetic court. Mutilation, seri-
ous alterations, publication of a truncated or garbled version of 
an artist's work have been treated by American courts as de-
manding some relief for the artist. Judicial opinions range from 
identifying the right in a work as purely proprietary to recogniz-
ing it as obviously personal. Many courts state that without stat-
utory provisions for the protection of personal rights, only a con-
tract between the parties can encompass the desired protections. 
More and more, the integrity of the work will be considered de-
serving of judicial protection, and grounds to support a remedy 
for a violation will reach to libel, unfair competition, copyright, 
84. Carlson, New Age Front Page, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, June, 1983, at 14. 
85. Id. at 18. 
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and the right of privacy. The burden of establishing the serious-
ness·of the invasion and its material harm to the work is placed 
upon the artist and artist attorneys. Case law seems to point to-
ward contract as the best basis for protection for writers licens-
ing their work. The weakness of their bargaining position is a 
reality, though not a bar to effective negotiation.86 
Recognition of moral rights may never be codified by stat-
ute in this country as it is in Europe. Yet, the enactment of the 
compulsory license section of the revised copyright statute87 and 
the passage in two important states of protective statutes88 for 
visual artists strongly indicate a favorable perspective. Legal 
scholars are notably encouraged by the interest in moral rights 
expressed by the nation's most respected copyright court in the 
Gilliam case.89 The basis for a positive shift in perspective has 
been established, suggesting that this country's courts may de-
velop and focus the support for artists' rights. 
Since the human rights movements of the '60's, public con-
sciousness of individual rights has continued to develop. Part of 
that development is respect for the creative spirit which blos-
soms most freely when the creator is allowed control over his 
means of expression, during and after creation. Recognition of 
the artist's personal rights in the integrity of his work is a 
healthy trend. A related concern is whether a moral rights doc-
trine places the artist in the position of censor of the work of 
other ·artists who are adapting the creator's work. Again, a bal-
ancing of interests is essential. Total control may translate as 
total deprivation of the public's need for creative nourishment. 
California and New York are pointing the way to an enlightened 
perspective regarding creators and their special needs, and our 
need to have access to work that is created without fear. As one 
86. Another insight from an entertainment industry insider emphasizes the diffi-
culty of a creative artist's position. A writer is encouraged to take a "professional pos-
ture" and accept his part in the collaborative enterprise of producing a film or teleplay. 
If loss of control over a script sold to a studio or owned by a studio employer is too 
difficult to accept, this industry professional suggests the writer find "a medium without 
a producer." Telephone interview with Martin Sweeney, Business Representative of the 
Writers Guild of Hollywood, (July 28, 1983). 
87. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976). 
88. See supra note 36 and note 39. 
89. Interview with Professor Neil Boorstyn, author of Copyright Law (1981), in San 
Francisco, October 18, 1983. 
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court admonishes: "Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law 
does not require us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary . 
production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a 
barrel of pork. "90 . 
Susan Rabin· 
90. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 184, 122 N.V.S. 206, 207 (Sup. Ct. 
1910) (Seabury, J. concurring). 
• Third-year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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